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We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term,
safe asset. We show that when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge
aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the interbank market is characterized by
excessive price volatility. In such a situation, a central bank can implement the con-
strained e!cient allocation by using open market operations to ﬁx the short term
interest rate. The model shows also that market freezes, where banks stop trading
with each other, can be a feature of the constrained e!cient allocation if there is su!-
cient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity
demand.
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Interbank markets are among the most important in the ﬁnancial system. They allow liq-
uidity to be readily transferred from banks with a surplus to banks with a deﬁcit. They are
the focus of central banks’ implementation of monetary policy and have a signiﬁcant eect
on the whole economy. Under normal circumstances the interbank markets, especially the
short term ones, work rather well. Given the high number of participants and the safe type
of assets often used in the transactions, the interbank markets are quite competitive and
issues of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with problems of asymmetric infor-
mation do not seem to play an important role. On occasion, however, such as in the crisis
that started in the summer of 2007, even the short-term interbank markets stop functioning
well thus inducing central banks to intervene massively in order to try to restore normal
conditions.
Despite their apparent importance, interbank markets have received relatively little at-
tention in the academic literature. In particular, there is so far no widely accepted theoretical
analysis of how they operate and of what type of imperfection may disrupt their function-
ing. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple theoretical framework for analyzing
interbank markets and how the central bank should intervene. Our starting point is that
banks use the interbank market to hedge themselves against liquidity shocks. However,
when hedging opportunities are limited so that markets are incomplete, banks cannot insure
themselves completely and the interbank market may exhibit excessive price volatility. By
using open market operations appropriately to ﬁx interest rates, the central bank can pre-
vent the price volatility and implement the constrained e!cient solution. Thus, the central
bank eectively completes the market, and open market operations are su!cient to deal with
systemic liquidity crises as argued by Goodfriend and King (1988).
Our analysis is based on a standard banking model developed in Allen and Gale (2004a,b)
and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008). There are two periods in the usual way. Banks can
hold one-period liquid assets or two-period long term assets with a higher return. All assets
1are risk free in the sense that their promised payos are always paid. Banks face uncertain
liquidity demands from their customers at the end of the ﬁrst period. We distinguish be-
tween two types of uncertainty concerning banks’ liquidity needs. The ﬁrst is idiosyncratic
uncertainty that arises from the fact that for any given level of aggregate demand for liquid-
ity there is uncertainty about which banks will face the demand. The basic role of interbank
markets is to allow reallocations of liquidity from banks with an excess to banks with a
deﬁcit. The second is the aggregate uncertainty that is due to the fact that the overall level
of the demand for liquidity that banks face is stochastic.
We start with the analysis of the optimal portfolio of assets and payments that a plan-
ner who can transfer liquidity costlessly would implement. We assume that the planner is
c o n s t r a i n e di nt h es a m ew a ya sb a n k st oo er deposit contracts where the payment at the
end of the ﬁrst period cannot be made contingent on the aggregate demand for liquidity in
the banking system or the bank’s individual liquidity demand. The resulting optimal allo-
cation is termed the constrained e!cient allocation because of this constraint to use deposit
contracts.
We next consider the operation of an interbank market where banks can buy and sell
the long term asset at the end of the ﬁrst period. Since all assets are risk free in our model,
there is no dierence between selling the long asset and using it as collateral in a repurchase
agreement. For ease of exposition, we consider outright sales of assets. The interbank
market allows reallocations of liquidity between banks that depend on the realizations of the
idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks. We focus on situations where the uncertainty
concerning liquidity demand is not su!cient to cause banks to fail. In other words, banks ﬁnd
it optimal to keep enough liquidity to insure themselves against the high aggregate liquidity
shock. The aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demand leads to volatile equilibrium prices
for the long asset at the end of the ﬁrst period, or equivalently interest rates. The intuition
hinges on the simple fact that prices in the interbank market have to adjust to satisfy the
market clearing condition and to provide banks with the appropriate incentives to keep the
2necessary liquidity initially. When the aggregate liquidity demand turns out to be low (that
is, in the good state), there is an excess supply of aggregate liquidity at the end of the ﬁrst
period. The price of the long term asset is bid up to the level where the return during
the second period is the same for both assets so that banks will be willing to hold both of
them. The high price in the good state implies that prices have to fall in the bad state,
that is when the high aggregate liquidity shock is realized, in order for banks to be willing
to hold both the short and the long term assets initially. If this was not the case, the long
asset would dominate the short asset and banks would not hold any liquidity to start with.
Given that consumers are risk averse, this price volatility is ine!cient because it leads to
consumption volatility across states thus preventing the implementation of the constrained
e!cient allocation.
The main result of the paper is to show that the introduction of a central bank that
engages in open market operations to ﬁx the price of the long asset at the end of the ﬁrst
period (or equivalently ﬁx the short term interest rate) removes the ine!ciency associated
with a lack of hedging opportunities. This intervention allows the banks to implement the
constrained e!cient allocation. To see how this occurs it is helpful to consider two special
cases. The ﬁrst is where there is just idiosyncratic liquidity risk and no aggregate risk.
Provided the central bank engages in the right open market operations and ﬁxes the price
in the interbank market at the end of the ﬁrst period at the appropriate level, banks with
a high liquidity demand will be able to sell their holdings of the long term asset to raise
liquidity. The banks with low liquidity demand at the end of the ﬁrst period are happy to
buy the long asset and provide liquidity to the market because they need payosa tt h ee n d
of the second period to meet their needs then.
The second special case is where there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty but there is ag-
gregate uncertainty about liquidity demand. Here the central bank must ﬁx the price by
engaging in open market operations. In particular, it needs to remove excess liquidity from
the banks by selling the long asset when aggregate liquidity demand is low. It can do this
3by selling government securities that replicate the long asset that are funded through lump
sum taxes on late consumers at the ﬁnal date. The optimal intervention by the central bank
when there is both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty combines the two policies in the
special cases. The central bank must ﬁx the price at the appropriate level that allows banks
to reallocate liquidity from those with low idiosyncratic shocks to those with high ones. At
the same time it must use open market operations to control the aggregate liquidity in the
market to ﬁx the price. We show that achieving both objectives simultaneously is possi-
ble and the constrained e!cient allocation can be implemented. This result is in line with
the argument of Goodfriend and King (1988) that open market operations are su!cient to
address pure liquidity risk on the interbank market.
One of the implications of our model is that even when the constrained e!cient allocation
is being implemented by the policies of the central bank, an increase in aggregate uncertainty
can cause banks to stop using the interbank markets to trade with each other. The banks
hoard liquidity because they may need it to meet high aggregate demand. When aggregate
demand is low, however, they have enough liquidity to deal with variations in idiosyncratic
demand and as a result the market “freezes”. At least in the context of the model considered
here, where the market freezing does not have consequences on the banks’ ability to remain
active, there is no need for central banks to intervene to try and unfreeze the markets since
the freeze is consistent with constrained e!ciency.
The basic problem in our model that leads to a need for central bank intervention is that
ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. In particular, banks are unable to hedge the idiosyncratic
and aggregate liquidity shocks that they face. In the remaining part of the paper we consider
how complete markets would operate and allow these risks to be hedged. There are many
forms that such complete markets could take. We consider how markets for Arrow securities
where all trades are made at the initial date allow the constrained e!cient allocation to be
implemented. We also show how a sequence of markets at the initial date followed by a
market for second period consumption at the end of the ﬁrst period can also implement the
4constrained e!cient allocation. Both of these cases involve a large number of securities being
issued and traded. In practice, the costs of issuance and of the infrastructure for trading
securities to implement such a system are likely to be prohibitive.
Our paper is not the only one to consider ine!ciencies in the interbank market. In a
recent contribution, Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) model the interbank markets
as being characterized by moral hazard, asymmetric information, and monopoly power in
times of crisis. In their model, a bank with surplus liquidity is able to bargain with a bank
that needs liquidity to keep funding projects. This bargaining allows the surplus bank to
extract surplus from the deﬁcit bank and this results in an ine!cient allocation of resources.
The role of the central bank in their model is to provide an outside option to the deﬁcit
bank for acquiring the needed liquidity. Even if the central bank does not actually provide
the liquidity the ine!cient bargaining can be avoided. The authors provide a number of
historical examples where some banks had monopoly power over others in times of crisis.
An important issue is how relevant their analysis is for modern interbank markets. Still
focusing on problems of asymmetric information, Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008)
ﬁnd that when a bank’s credit risk cannot be directly observed safer borrowers drop out of
the interbank market and lenders hoard liquidity despite the high prevailing interest rate
when the counterparty risk in the market rises su!ciently. Dierently from both of these
papers, we abstract from issues of asymmetric information and analyze situations where the
pure inability of banks to hedge themselves against liquidity shocks can lead to ine!ciencies
in the equilibrium prices.
Several other papers have studied the functioning of interbank markets. Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987) show that banks can optimally cope with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks by
borrowing and lending liquidity; but tend to under-invest in liquidity reserves when moral
hazard and adverse selection problems are present. Allen and Gale (2000) show that inter-
bank markets provide optimal liquidity insurance when banks are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks, but may lead to contagion when aggregate shocks are present and connections among
5banks are limited. In a similar spirit, Freixas et al. (2000) analyze the risk of contagious runs
through the payment system when banks are located in dierent regions and face both liq-
uidity and solvency shocks. Other reasons for the poor functioning of the interbank market
relate to asymmetric information (Flannery, 1996; and Freixas and Jorge, 2007) and banks’
free riding on central bank liquidity (Repullo, 2005).
There are also a number of related papers where assets are liquidated in markets that
do not work properly and some government intervention may be needed. The optimal form
of intervention depends on the reason why the liquidation markets do not allocate liquidity
e!ciently. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) analyze the optimal
liquidity provision by a central bank or a government authority when interbank markets are
subject to aggregate liquidity shocks and contagious failures generated by the illiquidity of
bank assets. Gorton and Huang (2004) show that government may optimally supply liquidity
by issuing government bonds when banks need to sell distressed assets in an illiquid market.
Gorton and Huang (2006) explain the lender of last resort function of central banks with the
need of monitoring banks and providing them with liquidity in times of crises in order to
prevent ine!cient panics. In a context where banks may herd and generate banking crises by
forcing a reduction in bank asset prices, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) show that it may
be optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. Such an ex post policy, however,
is dominated by an ex ante liquidity assistance policy to the surviving banks in the purchase
of failed banks.
The main dierence between all of these analyses and ours is that they focus on very dif-
ferent types of market failure based on asymmetric information, moral hazard, and monopoly
power. In practice interbank markets tend to be highly competitive, e!cient markets. Trans-
actions often involve transactions in safe government securities or are in the form of repur-
chase agreements that are collateralized with safe government securities so that the impor-
tance of asymmetric information and moral hazard are limited. In contrast, our analysis is
based on incomplete markets that result in limited hedging opportunities for banks. The
6m o d e li sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hc o m p e t i t i v ea n dl i q u i dm a r k e t sw h e r ep a r t i c i p a n t sh a v es y m m e t -
ric information. Moreover, most of these papers do not consider the type of central bank
intervention that is actually observed in interbank markets where central banks use open
market operations to ﬁx short term interest rates. This type of intervention is the focus of
our analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The constrained e!cient
allocation is considered in Section 3. We then consider the operation of an interbank market
f o rt h el o n ga s s e ti nS e c t i o n4 .T h er o l eo ft h ec e n t r a lb a n ki sa n a l y z e di nS e c t i o n5 .S e c t i o n
7 considers how complete markets would implement the constrained e!cient allocation.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
The model is based on Allen and Gale (2004a,b) and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008). There
a r et h r e ed a t e sw =0 >1>2 and a single, all-purpose good that can be used for consumption
or investment at each date. The banking sector consists of a large number of competitive
institutions.
There are two securities, one short and one long. Both are risk free. The short security
is represented by a storage technology: one unit at date w produces one unit at date w +1 .
The long security is a simple constant-returns-to-scale investment technology that takes two
periods to mature: one unit invested in the long security at date 0 produces UA1 units of
the good at date 2 so it is more productive than the short security.
We assume there is a market for liquidating the long asset at date 1.E a c h u n i t c a n b e
sold for S. Participation in this market is limited: ﬁnancial institutions such as banks can
buy and sell in the asset market at date 1 but individual consumers cannot.
Banks raise funds from depositors, who have an endowment of one unit of the good
at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncertain about their preferences:
7with probability  they are early consumers, who only value the good at date 1,a n dw i t h
probability 1 they are late consumers, who only value the good at date 2.T h e r ea r et w o
types of uncertainty that determine  :
l = l + %
where l>l= K>O is an idiosyncratic bank-speciﬁc shock and  =0 >1 is an aggregate shock.
Except where otherwise stated we assume %A0= For simplicity, we assume that the random
variables l and  have two-point supports. That is:
K =¯  +  w. pr. 0=5>
O =¯    w. pr. 0=5>





0 w. pr. >
1 w. pr. (1  )>
where 0 ??1. Because there are only two values of > the price at which the long asset
can be sold at date 1 t a k e sa tm o s tt w ov a l u e s ,S> where  =0 >1.
Uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for the
intermediary as a provider of liquidity insurance. The utility of consumption is represented
by a utility function x(f) with the usual properties. Expected utility at date 0 is given by
HX = H [x(g)+( 1 )x(f)]>
where fw denotes consumption at date w =1 >2=
Banks compete by oering deposit contracts to consumers in exchange for their endow-
ments and consumers respond by choosing the most attractive of the contracts oered. Free
entry ensures that banks earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. The deposit contracts oered in
8equilibrium must maximize consumers’ welfare subject to the zero-proﬁt constraint. Other-
wise, a bank could enter and make a positive proﬁt by oering a more attractive contract.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that consumers deposit their entire endowment
in a bank at date 0 since the bank can do anything the consumers can do. The bank invests
| units per capita in the short asset and 1  | units per capita in the long asset and oers
each consumer a deposit contract, which allows the consumer to withdraw either g units at
date 1 or the residue of the bank’s assets at date 2 divided equally among the remaining
depositors.
A consumer’s type is private information. An early consumer cannot misrepresent his
type because he needs to consume at date 1; but a late consumer can claim to be an early
consumer, withdraw g at date 1, store it until date 2 and then consume it. The deposit
contract is incentive compatible if and only if the residual payment to late consumers at date
2 is at least g. Since the late consumers are residual claimants at date 2,i ti sp o s s i b l et o
give them at least g units of consumption if and only if
g +( 1 )g
S
U
 | + S(1  |)= (1)
The left hand side is a lower bound for the present value of consumption at date 1 when
early consumers are given g and late consumers are given at least g. The ﬁrst term is the
consumption given to the early consumers. The second term is the present value of the
(1  )g given to the late consumers. The price of the long asset at date 1 is S and this
long asset pays o U at date 2 so the date 1 present value of 1 unit of consumption at date
2 is S@U.T h er i g h th a n ds i d ei st h ev a l u eo ft h eb a n k ’ sp o r t f o l i o .T h eb a n kh a s| in the
short asset and (1|) of the long asset worth S per unit. Thus, condition (1) is necessary
and su!cient for the deposit contract g to satisfy incentive compatibility and the budget
constraint simultaneously. If (1) was not satisﬁed the late consumers would receive less than
the early consumers if they left their funds in the bank so they would ﬁnd it optimal to
9withdraw and there would be a run. The inequality in (1) is referred to as the incentive
constraint for short. We restrict our analysis to the set of parameters where this constraint
is satisﬁed for the optimal contract. We also assume that bank runs do not occur when the
constraint is satisﬁed. In other words, late consumers will withdraw at date 2 as long as
the bank can satisfy the incentive constraint.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. In particular, depositors learn
whether they are early or late consumers and the values of  and  are determined. While
each depositor’s individual realization of liquidity demand is observed only by them,  and
 are publicly observed.
3 The constrained e!cient allocation
The planner invests in a portfolio of the short and long asset. The proceeds are distributed
directly to early and late consumers. The planner does not need to worry about idiosyncratic
liquidity risk since the K group with K early consumers will be balanced by the O group
with O early consumers. It is possible to just plan for ¯  early consumers in total.
The planner provides early consumers with consumption g and late consumers receive
f20 when  =0and f21 when  =1 .U s i n gt h en o t a t i o n0 =¯  and 1 =¯ +% the planner’s
problem can be written
max
|>g
[0x(g)+( 1 0)x(f20)] + (1  )[1x(g)+( 1 1)x(f21)]
s.t.
0g  |
(1  0)f20 = |  0g +( 1 |)U
1g  |
(1  1)f21 = |  1g +( 1 |)U
0  g>0  |  1=
(2)
The ﬁrst two constraints represent the physical constraints on consumption at the two
10dates in state  =0 .A td a t e1 i ti sn o tp o s s i b l et oc o n s u m em o r eo u t p u tt h a ne x i s t s .A td a t e
2 the (10) late consumers consume f20= The total amount available for them is whatever
is not consumed at date 1, |  0g> together with what is produced at date 2> (1  |)U=
Similarly for the next two constraints for state  =1 = Finally, we have the usual constraints
on g and |=
We denote the optimal solution to this problem |W and gW= Note that it cannot be the
case at the optimum that |W A 1gW= If this inequality held, it would be possible to increase




























































since x00 ? 0= Thus the constrained e!cient allocation is unique.














With constant relative risk aversion utility it can be shown that gW ? 1 if relative risk aversion
is less than one and gW A 1 if it is greater than one (see, e.g., pp. 68-69 of Allen and Gale
(2007)).
We turn next to consider the allocation when there is an interbank market at date 1 that
allows banks to buy and sell the long asset.
4I n t e r b a n k m a r k e t s
Suppose there is an interbank market at date 1 for trading the long asset at price S= Banks
can buy the long and short assets at date 0 for a price of 1 and at date 1 it is also possible
to buy the short term asset at a price of 1. This set of markets is incomplete in that it is
not possible to completely hedge the risk of aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. It
is shown that this incompleteness leads to price volatility.
O n c et h eb a n k sh a v er e c e i v e dt h ef u n d so fd e p o s i t o r sa td a t e0 they can use them to
obtain the long and the short assets. In addition to choosing their portfolio of | in the safe
asset and 1| in the long asset at date 0,t h e ym u s ta l s os e tt h ea m o u n tg that depositors
can withdraw at date 1. Once they know the level of aggregate liquidity demand and their
own idiosyncratic liquidity shock at date 1>they can use the interbank market to buy or sell
the long asset.
The consumption of a bank’s depositors at date 2 depends on the aggregate state since
this determines S= It also depends on the idiosyncratic shock that strikes the bank since
this determines the proportions  of early and 1   of late consumers. In particular, for |
12and g such that the incentive constraint (1) is satisﬁed so bankruptcy is avoided
f2l =
h







for  =0 >1 and l = K>O= The term in square brackets represents the amount of long asset
held by the bank at date 2.T h e(1|) term is the initial holding of the long asset purchased
at date 0= If |  lgA0 then excess liquidity at date 1 can be used to purchase the long
asset. The amount of the long asset that can be purchased is (|  lg)@S= If |  lg?0
then it is necessary to sell the long asset held by the bank in the market at date 1 to fund
the shortfall of liquidity. In this case (|lg)@S represents the amount that must be sold.
Each unit of the long asset pays o U and the total payo must be split between the (1l)
late consumers.
For | and g such that the incentive constraint (1) is not satisﬁed so there is a run on the
bank and it has to liquidate all of its assets at date 1
f2l = | +( 1 |)S> (7)
for  =0 >1 and l = K>O= The ﬁrst term | is the payo of the short asset and the second
term (1|)S is what is obtained from liquidating the long asset in the interbank market at
date 1. As explained above, we focus on the case where the incentive constraint is satisﬁed
at the bank’s optimal choice. We will therefore take f2l to be given by (6) below.
The problem each bank solves at date 0 is to choose | and g to
max
0=5{[0Kx(g)+( 1 0K)x(f20K)+0Ox(g)+( 1 0O)x(f20O)]
+(1  )[1Kx(g)+( 1 1K)x(f21K)+1Ox(g)+( 1 1O)x(f21O)]}
s.t. 0  g>0  |  1>
(8)
13taking prices S0 and S1 as given. The ﬁrst order conditions for this with respect to the

















0(f21O)] = 0 (9)











0(f21K)+( O + %)x
0(f21O))] = 0= (10)
Now since the aggregate measure of banks is 1 the aggregate amount of liquidity is |.
There are two aggregate states of demand for liquidity,  =0where 0 =¯  and  =1where
1 =¯  + %. Within each of these states, half of the banks have high idiosyncratic demand,
K> for liquidity= In this case they can liquidate part of their holdings of the long asset
in the interbank market to meet the high demand for liquidity from their customers. The
other half of the banks have low liquidity demand, O= They are willing to use their excess
liquidity to buy the long asset in the interbank market. Since, we are assuming bankruptcy
is not optimal, we know that the aggregate amount of liquidity | must be su!cient to cover
demand in state  =1so we have
|  (¯  + %)g=
Since %A0 this implies that
|A¯ g=
As a result there is excess liquidity at date 1 in state  =0 = In order for the interbank market
to clear it is necessary that
S0 = U= (11)
In this case banks are willing to hold both the long asset and the excess liquidity between
dates 1 and 2.I f S0 ?Uthey will be willing to hold only the long asset while if S0 AU
they will be willing to hold only the short asset. Hence S0 must be given by (11).
14Notice that if |A(¯  + %)g a similar argument would hold for state  =1and we would
have S1 = U=But this cannot be an equilibrium given S0 = U because then the long asset
would dominate the short asset between dates 0 and 1 and there would be no investment in
the short asset at all= Hence equilibrium requires
| =( ¯  + %)g = 1g= (12)
It then follows that S1 must be such that banks are willing to hold both the long and
short asset between dates 0 and 1. To ﬁnd the equilibrium value of S1we substitute for S0
and | using (11) and (12) and solve the ﬁrst order conditions (9) and (10) for S1 and g.
An important issue concerns the circumstances under which the interbank market “freezes”
or in other words when the banks will stop trading with each other. The essential purpose
of the interbank market is to allow banks with high liquidity needs to sell the long asset and
obtain liquidity from banks with low liquidity needs. If the amount of liquidity the banks
hold to deal with aggregate uncertainty is large enough then in state  =0when aggregate
liquidity demand is low, they may not need to go to the interbank market to raise liquidity
since they hold so much internally anyway. In particular, they will not need to enter the
market in state  =0when they are an K bank if
1gA 0Kg=
Using 1 =¯  + % and 0K =¯  +  it can be seen that this simpliﬁes to
%A =
Thus the market will freeze if aggregate uncertainty is large enough relative to idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
155 Central bank intervention
In this section we introduce a central bank that can engage in open market operations.
In practice central banks hold large portfolios of securities that they use to intervene in the
markets. They buy or sell securities to aect the amount of liquidity held by banks. In recent
years the focus of most central banks has been to use open market operations to target the
interest rate in the overnight interbank market. In order to explain how the central bank
can implement the constrained e!cient allocation, we proceed in three steps. The ﬁrst is to
show how this can be done when there is only idiosyncratic risk. The second is to show how
open market operations can be used when there is just aggregate risk. Finally, we consider
the two types of risk together.
5.1 Idiosyncratic liquidity risk alone: A0>%=0
We start with the simplest case where there is only idiosyncratic risk in liquidity demand,
and no aggregate risk so A0>%=0 . It was shown in Section 3 that in the special case of
log utility where x(f)=l o g h f the constrained e!cient allocation is
| =¯ ;g =1 ;f2 = U=
A l l e na n dG a l e( 2 0 0 4 b )s h o wt h a ti nt h i sc a s ei ft h e r ei san o n - s t o c h a s t i cp r i c e ,t h e nt h e r e
is a unique equilibrium with S =1that corresponds to the constrained e!cient allocation=
To see that this is an equilibrium note that if SA1> then the long asset dominates, while if
S?1 the short asset dominates. Only if S =1are banks willing to hold both assets between
dates 0 and 1. Allen and Gale also show that there are many other sunspot equilibria with
random prices. Since there is idiosyncratic risk the banks trade at these prices and this leads
to an allocation that is worse in an ex ante sense than the constrained e!cient allocation.
Given this multiplicity of equilibria, by setting S =1the central bank ensures that the
constrained e!cient allocation is implemented. In this equilibrium banks that have a high
16liquidity shock K sell the long asset and banks with low liquidity shock O buy it. Both
types of banks can aord to implement the optimal allocation at date 1. One unit of the
short asset enables them to provide early consumers with g =1w h i l eo n eu n i to ft h el o n g
asset, which costs the same, allows them to provide the late consumers with f2 = U= Any
composition of their depositors between early and late can therefore be accommodated.
This case is, of course, very special because of the log utility function. The fact that g =1
and f2 = U leads to the special property that banks are indierent between having early
and late consumers. We next show that by holding an appropriate portfolio of securities and
engaging in open market operations and ﬁxing the the price of the long asset at S =1 ,t h e
central bank can ensure that this property holds more generally.
Let |W>g W> and fW
2 denote the constrained e!cient allocation as before. Since there is no
aggregate uncertainty we know that it is e!cient to use the short asset to provide early











Our approach is to show that the banks can provide their depositors with this allocation
provided the central bank adopts the optimal policy. We also show that it is individually
optimal for each bank to choose it.
Let [0 denote the lump sum tax that is imposed by the government at date 0 to fund
the portfolio for open market operations of the central bank. The central bank uses these
funds to buy the short term asset at date 0.D e p o s i t o r s t h e n h a v e 1  [0 remaining that
they put in the banks. Suppose the banks hold |W  [0 in the short asset and 1  |W in the
long asset between dates 0 and 1.
At date 1, half the banks have K =¯  +  early consumers while the other half have
O =¯   = Banks of type l>l = K>O require total liquidity of lgW= They have liquidity
17|W[0 so their net need is |W[0 lgW= If this is positive they use it to buy the long term
asset. If it is negative they sell the long term asset to raise the needed liquidity. The central
bank sets S =1and supplies its holding of the short asset [0 to the market and receives
[0 of the long asset. The interbank market clears since
0=5(|
W  [0  Kg
W)+0 =5(|
W  [0  Og
W)+[0 = |
W  ¯ g
W =0 =
Ab a n ko ft y p el now has 1  |W + |W  [0 lgW =1 [0 lgW in the long asset. At
date 2 these holdings allow the banks to provide a payout to their late consumers of
2l =
(1  [0  lgW)U
1  l
=
At date 2, the central bank has [0U. These funds are remitted to the government and





In order to implement the constrained e!cient allocation, it is necessary that the sum of
these payouts is equal to fW
2= Thus we need
2l + 2 =











It can easily be checked that
[0 =1 g
W
solves this equation for any value of l=
We next need to show that if the central bank implements the optimal policy with
S =1 >[ 0 =1gW> and 2 =( 1 gW)U@(1 ) that if each bank takes this policy as given
it is optimal for them to choose the constrained e!cient allocation.
18Each bank has deposits of 1[0= It invests in | of the short asset and 1[0 | of the
long asset at date 0. The bank’s problem is
Max
|>g
0=5[Kx(g)+( 1 K)x(f2K)] + 0=5[Ox(g)+( 1 O)x(f2O)]
s.t. f2l =




+ 2 for l = K>O=
The objective function is the standard one. The expression for f2l is the sum of the payo
from the bank and the lump sum grant 2.T h ep a y o  from the bank is the original holding
of the long asset 1  [0  | and the amount purchased (or sold) at date 1 in the interbank
market (|  lg)@S= (Note that it is optimal not to hold any of the short asset from date
1 to date 2 provided S?Uwhich is the case here.) This long asset pays o U at date 2.
The total payo from the long asset is then divided among the 1  l late consumers of the
bank.
Now given the central bank sets S =1we have
f2l =
[1  [0  lg]U
1  l
+ 2 for l = K>O=
Thus the choice of | is irrelevant for each individual bank. We return to the determination
of the aggregate level of | below.








[1  [0  Og]U
1  O
+ 2)]=










[1  [0  Og]U
1  O
+ 2)(OU)] = 0=
Note that dierentiating with respect to g shows that the second order condition is satisﬁed.
Thus the bank has a unique optimal choice of g. Substituting for the central bank’s optimal































It follows from the deﬁnition of gW from the constrained e!cient allocation when there is no
aggregate risk (5) that this must be 0= Then g = gW i st h eu n i q u eo p t i m a lc h o i c ef o rt h e
banks.
I tr e m a i n st oc o n s i d e rh o wt h ea g g r e g a t ev a l u eo f| is determined. Market clearing at
date 1 requires that | = |W = gW and this determines the aggregate amount of the short
asset in equilibrium.
To sum up, it is not only feasible but is in fact optimal for the banks to implement the
constrained e!cient allocation.
We have shown that the central bank can use open market operations to implement the
constrained e!cient allocation. By holding a portfolio of 1gW of the short asset and setting
S =1the central bank eectively allows the banks to be indierent to having early or late
20consumers. They give early consumers gW and late consumers
2l =




Both cost the same to accommodate in the date 1 market. Thus the size of a bank’s idiosyn-
cratic shock becomes irrelevant. We have demonstrated this for two groups K and O but it
is clear that the same result will hold for an arbitrary distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
In the discussion so far, we have used the terminology that [0 =1 gW is a lump sum
tax that ﬁnances the central bank’s holdings of the short asset from date 0 to date 1.T h e
central bank uses these holdings to purchase the long term asset and holds it between date 1
and date 2.A td a t e2 the payos from this long term asset are paid to the government and
they are used to ﬁnance a lump sum grant to late consumers. This terminology presumes
gW ? 1= This will be the case if, for example, constant relative risk aversion is su!ciently
below 1. However, it is also quite possible that gW A 1 if, for example, constant relative risk
aversion is su!ciently above 1= In this case all the signs are reversed. Instead of a lump
sum tax, [0 represents a lump sum grant of an asset that replicates the short asset. In
other words, the asset is “money”. The central bank has a liability rather than an asset.
At date 1 the central bank sells an asset that replicates the long term asset issued by the
government to remove the money from the banking system. At date 2 there is a lump sum
tax to make the payment on the government asset replicating the long asset. Thus the theory
presented provides a rich model of central bank intervention in the interbank markets. This
theory distinguishes between interventions using real assets that are claims on technologies
and interventions using liabilities of the government that are money and long term bonds.
We next consider how open market operations can be used to deal with aggregate liquidity
risk.
215.2 Aggregate liquidity risk alone:  =0 >%A0
Next consider what happens with no idiosyncratic risk but with positive aggregate risk= In
this case the constrained e!cient allocation can be implemented by having the central bank
engage in open market operations to ﬁx S0 = S1 =1 =
Let |W>g W> and fW
2 denote the allocation. We know from Section 3 that
|
W = 1g





|W  0gW +( 1 |W)U
1  0
=









As usual we show that it is feasible for the banks to implement the constrained e!cient
allocation. Given that this provides the highest level of expected utility that is possible, if
it is feasible it must be optimal for the banks to choose it.
At date 0 the banks hold |W of the short asset and 1  |W of the long asset.
At date 1 in state  =0the central bank needs to drain liquidity to ensure S0 =1 = The
government issues [1 = %gW of debt at date 1 that pays U at date 2. Thus the total owed by
the government on its debt at date 2 is %gWU= The debt is given to the central bank at date 1
to allow it to conduct open market operations to ﬁx the price of the long asset or equivalently
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei nt h ei n t e r b a n km a r k e t .I no r d e rt od ot h i si ts e l l st h eg o v e r n m e n td e b t ,
which is equivalent to the long asset, for S0 =1 = This removes the excess liquidity from the
market and prevents the price of the long asset being bid up to S0 = U= The central bank
holds the liquidity of %gW that it acquires until date 2.
After the central bank’s open market operations, the banks own 1  |W+ %gWof the long
asset. At date 2 this allows each of them to pay to each of their 1  0 late consumers
20 =
(1  |W + %gW)U
1  0
=
22The central bank ends up at date 2 with [1 = %gW of the short asset. We assume that the
proceeds from these assets are returned to the government. The government has resources
of %gW and owes %gWU o ni t sl o n gt e r md e b ts oi tn e e d st oi m p o s eal u m ps u mt a xo ne a c ho f





distributed as a lump sum grant to the late consumers.
Hence late consumers receive
20 + 20 =





as required to implement the constrained e!cient allocation.
At date 1 in state  =1each bank pays gW to 1 early consumers. They have no short
asset and 1  |W of the long asset after this. The central bank does not need to actively
conduct open market operations to ensure S1 =1so it does not intervene. Each bank pays







This demonstrates that the banks can implement the constrained e!cient allocation given
the open market operations of the central bank described. As in Section 5.1 we need to show
that it is individually optimal for each bank to implement this given the central bank is
pursuing its optimal policy. Given S =1it follows that the choice of | does not matter
at the individual bank level as before and the aggregate level of | is determined by market















It can straightforwardly be checked that the objective function is a concave function of g so
23that there is a unique optimal value of g for each bank. Moreover, this optimal level is gW>
t h es a m ea st h ev a l u ei nt h ec o n s t r a i n e de !cient allocation.
6 Idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity risk: A0>%A0
We continue to denote the constrained e!cient allocation |W>g W> and fW
2 as in (13)-(15).
With both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk the open market operations of the central bank
necessary to implement the constrained e!cient allocation combine the elements from the
two cases alone. At date 0 the government imposes a lump sum tax of [0 and gives it to the
central bank. The central bank uses it to fund a portfolio of the short asset. At date 1 in
state  =0the central bank ﬁxes the price of the long asset at S0 =1by removing liquidity
from the market. In order to do this it uses government securities that pay U at date 2 and
sells them at S0 =1 = The quantity of government securities issued at date 1 is denoted [1=
In order to ensure the price of the long asset can be successfully ﬁxed, it is necessary that




This ensures that all of the excess liquidity is drained from the banks into the central bank
and there is no pressure to push up S0 in state  =0 .
The date 2 interest paid on the securities issued at date 1 is paid from the short asset
held by the central bank. If any is left over then this is paid out as a lump sum grant to
late consumers. If the resources of the central bank are insu!cient then the shortfall is
covered by a lump sum tax. In state  =1the central bank needs to supply liquidity to the
market because there is just enough liquidity in the ﬁnancial system |W = 1gW to satisfy
the aggregate demand in state  =1 = If the central bank did not release this liquidity the
banks would not have enough to satisfy the demands of their early consumers. It does this
by using the short asset it holds to buy the long asset. This enables it to ﬁx the price at
S1 =1 =
24We next determine the choice of [0 and [1 and the banks’ portfolio that implements
the constrained e!cient allocation. At date 0 after the lump sum tax of [0 the depositors
have 1  [0 remaining and they deposit this in the banks. The banks choose a portfolio of
|W  [0 in the short asset and 1  |W in the long asset.
At date 1 in state  =0the l banks need liquidity 0lgW to satisfy the demands of their
early consumers. They have |W [0= They therefore sell 0lgW (|W [0) of the long asset.
(Note that if 0lgW ? (|W [0) this is negative and they are buying the long asset, the total
supply of which includes that issued by the central bank.) The amount of the long asset
they have remaining is 1|W[0lgW  (|W  [0)] = 10lgW[0= At date 2 they are able
to use the payos of these long term assets to give each of their 1  0l late consumers to
provide a payout of
20l =
(1  0lgW  [0)U
1  0l
=
In addition to this payo from the bank the late consumers receive a lump sum grant (or
tax) from the government. The central bank has [0 in cash from date 0= As explained above,
at date 1 they issue [1 = %gW  [0 of securities that pay U at date 2= Thus at date 2 the
total amount owed in interest is [1U =( %gW  [0)U= The central bank holds the proceeds
of the debt issue [1 = %gW  [0 in the short asset. In total they have [0 + %gW  [0 = %gW
of the short asset. This allows a lump sum grant to each of the 1  0 late consumers of
20 =
%gW  (%gW  [0)U
1  0
=
[0U  %gW(U  1)
1  0
=
The amount received by each of the late consumers in the l = K>O banks is
20l + 20 =
(1  0lgW  [0)U
1  0l
+
[0U  %gW(U  1)
1  0
= (17)
In order to implement the constrained e!cient allocation, it is necessary that this is equal
25to the constrained e!cient allocation fW
20 so we have
20l + 20 =
(1  0lgW  [0)U
1  0l
+









As with just idiosyncratic risk it can be seen
[0 =1 g
W (18)
allows both K and O banks to implement the constrained e!cient allocation.
It remains to show that [0 =1 gW allows the banks to ensure early consumers receive
gW and late consumers receive fW
21= Similarly to (17) it can be shown that late consumers
receive
21 + 21 =






The main dierence here is in last term, which is the lump sum grant. As explained above,
in state  =1the central bank at date 1 uses the short term asset to purchase [0 of the
long asset. This pays o a total of [0U at date 2 to be distributed among the 1  1 late
consumers.
Again substituting [0 =1 gW and using |W = 1gWit follows that






Thus the central bank policy described allows banks to implement the constrained e!cient
allocation.
It remains to show that it is optimal for each individual bank to choose g = gW as the
optimal contract. This can be done in the same way as in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Just as in Section 4, if aggregate uncertainty is su!ciently large relative to idiosyncratic
uncertainty the banks will stop trading with each other in state  =0and in this sense
26the market freezes. As there, the condition for the market to freeze is that 1gA 0Kg or
equivalently
%A =
The dierence here is that the K banks continue to trade with the central bank, however. The
central bank sells long securities to the banks but that is the only trade that takes place. Since
now these allocations with market freezes are constrained e!c i e n tt h e yc a n n o tb ei m p r o v e d
on. Thus the observation that banks stop lending to each other does not necessarily mean
there is a market failure or ine!ciency. The model here provides an example where market
freezes are e!cient.
7C o m p l e t e m a r k e t s
In the model analyzed so far, markets are incomplete because it is not possible to hedge
aggregate or idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In this section we consider the allocation that would
occur with complete markets where liquidity risk can be hedged. This version of the model
is a special case of that considered in Allen and Gale (2004a). They show that with complete
markets and incomplete contracts of the type considered here the allocation is constrained
e!cient. In other words, a planner subject to the constraint of using a ﬁxed payment in the
ﬁrst period cannot improve upon the complete markets allocation. Institutionally there are
an u m b e ro fw a y st h a tc o m p l e t em a r k e t sc a nb ei m p l e m e n t e d .W ef o c u so nt w o .T h eﬁ r s ti s
where all trades occur at date 0.T h i s i s t e r m e d t h e static case. The second is where trades
occur at both dates 0 and 1 a n dt h i si st e r m e dt h edynamic case.
7.1 Static complete markets
One of the simplest institutional structures to understand is where all trade takes place at
date 0. Initially we will focus on aggregate risk and will introduce idiosyncratic risk at a
later stage. For the moment, 0 =¯  and 1 =¯  + %=
27So far we have assumed that assets are held by the bank. Since the assets are produced
with constant returns to scale, with complete markets there will be zero proﬁts associated
with producing them. Therefore it does not matter which agents hold them. Let’s suppose
initially ﬁrms hold them and issue securities against them. Banks use the funds from deposits
to buy these securities. We will model these securities in the form of Arrow securities where
each security pays o 1 in a particular state and nothing in any of the other states. All of
these Arrow securities are traded at date 0.
There are ﬁve aggregate states in total. At date 0 there is one state. There are two
states  =0 >1 at the two subsequent dates w =1 >2 to give four further states (w>) for a
total of ﬁve= We take consumption at date 0 as the numeraire with the price of the Arrow
security paying o 1 unit of consumption in that state normalized at 1= The prices of the
Arrow securities that pay o one unit of consumption in the other states (w>) are denoted
sw.
We can represent the short assets and the long asset by their payos in the ﬁve states
(0>10>11>20>21) as follows:
Asset Payos Zero-proﬁt condition
Short asset from date 0 to 1( 1>1>1>0>0) 1+s10 + s11  0
"""" 1 to 2 in state  =0 ( 0 >1>0>1>0) s10 + s20  0
"""" 1 to 2 in state  =1 ( 0 >0>1>0>1) s11 + s21  0
Long asset from date 0 to 1( 1>0>0>1>1) 1+s20U + s21U  0
If the zero proﬁt condition is satisﬁed with an equality the asset is produced. If it is
satisﬁed with a strict inequality it is not produced. To implement the constrained e!cient
allocation for Example 1 we have
1+s10 + s11 =0 ;s10 + s20 =0 ;s11 + s21 ? 0;1+s20U + s21U =0 =
The problem of the representative bank is to use the Arrow security markets at date 0
to purchase the units of consumption to maximize its depositors expected utility. The total
28amount of consumption it purchases is g at date 1 and (1)f2 at date 2 for  =0 >1=The
bank chooses g>f20> and f21 to
max [0x(g)+( 1 0)x(f20)] + (1  )[1x(g)+( 1 1)x(f21)]
s.t.
s100g + s20(1  0)f20 + s111g + s21(1  1)f21 =1
0  g>f20>f 21=
(20)
The ﬁrst line is the expected utility of the depositor. The second is the budget constraint in
the date 0 markets. There is a single budget constraint because all transactions take place
at date 0. The third line has the usual non-negativity constraints.
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint , the ﬁrst order conditions








Substituting the constrained e!cient values of g>f20> and f21 into these, and using the
budget constraint and the zero proﬁt conditions, it is possible to derive the prices that
implement the constrained e!cient allocation. These prices allow the ﬁrms to produce the
assets at zero proﬁts, and the banks to maximize the depositors’ welfare.
So far we have abstracted from idiosyncratic risk. We next consider how this can be
accommodated. Suppose each ﬁrm issues state-contingent Arrow securities based on the
shock K or O experienced by the purchasing bank. They issue these securities in small
amounts and to enough banks that the idiosyncratic risk is diversiﬁed away.
Each bank will buy enough of the K and O securities to cover their needs in each of the
states. As usual we denote l = l +% for  =0 >1 and l = K>O=The Arrow securities each
bank buys are lg at date 1 and (1  l)f2 at date 2 for  =0 >1 and l = K>O= The price
29of these securities are swl for w =1 >2>=0 >1 and l = K>O=
In order for the banks to be able to aord the optimal state contingent securities it is
necessary that
KswK + OswO = sw for w =1 >2 and  =0 >1=
Since the aggregate state w i st h es a m ef o re a c hK and O,a n d0=5 of the banks are K and
0=5 are O consider the symmetric equilibrium with
swK = swO =0 =5sw=
This ensures that the banks can aord to purchase the constrained e!cient allocation. Since
this gives the highest expected utility for the depositors, it is the best that the banks can
do.
In the case of incomplete markets, the banks held the assets. With complete markets we
have, for simplicity, been assuming that ﬁrms hold the assets and issue the securities. Since
there are zero proﬁts from producing the assets we could just as well assume that the banks
held the assets. In order to obtain the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, they would issue securities
against the assets in the same way as the ﬁrms. They would also buy them in the same
way as previously. Thus they would be on both sides of the market buying and selling large
numbers of securities.
7.2 Dynamic complete markets
The institutional structure where all trades take place at date 0 described above is only one
institutional structure that will implement complete markets. Another structure is to have
dynamic markets. As before, to see how these operate consider the case with no idiosyncratic
risk ﬁrst.
The market structure is as follows. The ﬁrms issue Arrow securities between dates 0 and
1. These are contingent on the state  =0 >1 and allow the banks to hedge this risk. For
30simplicity, we assume that security 0 pays o 1 unit of consumption at date 1 and has price
sW
0 at date 0= At date 1, there are markets for date 2 consumption that the banks and ﬁrms
can also trade in. Security 1 pays o 1 unit of consumption at date 2 and sells for price sW
1
at date 1.
In the dynamic market buying 1 unit of date 1 consumption is the same as buying it in




To buy one unit of consumption at date 2 in state > it is necessary to have sW
1 at date 1.
This is obtained by paying sW
0sW







Also the banks can implement the constrained e!cient allocation. Initially each bank
buys } = g+ sW
1(1  )f2 of consumption at date 1 for state  =0 >1= T h i sa l l o w si tt o
provide the g for its early consumers and buy the f2 for its late consumers.
For dynamic markets we have so far ignored idiosyncratic risk. This can be accom-
modated, similarly to static markets, by having ﬁrms issue a large number securities that
are contingent on the buying banks liquidity shock K or O= The banks buy }l = lg+
sW
1(1  l)f2 of date 1 consumption in states  =0 >1 a n dt h e nu s ew h a t e v e ri sl e f to v e r
after paying their early consumers to buy date 2 consumption for the late consumers. As








With these prices the bank can aord to purchase the constrained e!cient allocation, and
the ﬁrms satisfy the zero proﬁt conditions.
To sum up, in this section we have provided two institutional structures that implement
complete markets. Both require a large number of markets and securities to allow the
31idiosyncratic risk to be diversiﬁed away. Clearly it is not the case that all trades are made at
a single date in practice. In that sense the dynamic markets are in some sense more realistic.
However, they still require that banks buy and sell a large number of securities. In practice,
issuing securities is costly and this makes even the dynamic markets case implausible. This
is why the role of the central bank in implementing the constrained e!cient allocation is so
important.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a simple model of the interbank market. We have shown how
central bank intervention in the interbank market can improve welfare in a variety of situa-
tions.
The model is very simple. However, it can be extended in a number of directions to
consider important issues. First, so far we have ignored bankruptcy of ﬁnancial institutions.
Incorporating this will allow open market operations to be compared with lender of last resort
policies. Second, the model is a real one in that all the funds of the bank that are used for
intervention are raised through lump sum taxes. If the bank uses seigniorage instead then
this should allow some insight into the relationship between monetary policy and ﬁnancial
stability. Third, in the model the interest rates are tied down by technologies. One important
extension is to change the model so that the short term rate is not determined by the return
of the technology. This change would give the central bank the ability to vary the rate more
than in the current model and permits a richer analysis of central bank intervention.
Another important issue is how monetary policy aects real activity. Here we have banks
choosing portfolios of assets. These can be thought of as loans. By introducing loans to ﬁrm
explicitly and seeing how banks’ decisions interact with ﬁrms’ decisions we can obtain some
insight into the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity.
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